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Abstract
The way in which archaeological information is obtained, from the traditional processes to automatic capture and graphic computation, 
allows the establishment of spatial relations, the integration of environmental factors from the past, and, thus, the determination of the 
social characteristics of the historic period under study. By applying new technology methods to the analysis of building works carried 
out during the Iberian Peninsular Invasions, which constituted three lines of defense of Lisbon against the Napoleonic troops, a virtual 
three-dimensional model can be constructed based on existing places and on the determination of blind-spots in the fields of vision 
between the watch-towers. The future of this new methodology for the consideration of historical investigation is closely linked to the 
development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models, which allow new answers to new questions.
was happening. All of factors led to the defeat of a large, 
experienced, and well-equipped army.
2   General Technical Information
In fact, although it is theoretically possible to bring about 
the building of 152 forts in only one year, on the basis of 
five hours of labor per man to complete one meter in length 
of wall (far short of the numbers shown for those involved 
in this process, because after a certain point, it becomes 
impossible to manage construction work because of the 
presence of too many workers on the same site), there are 
other factors which had a bearing on the time needed for the 
building of a structure, such as the availability of materials 
(limestone) and equipment, as well as accessibility to the 
sites, which in this case was quite reduced for reasons of 
military strategy (i.e., dominant but discreet points in the 
landscape).
Even recognizing the possibility that this could have hap-
pened, that is, that the Linhas de Torres1, as these defenses 
are known, were built in only one year, it is impossible that 
the movement in the area, whether related to the transport of 
materials (huge ashlars on ox-carts), or to the distance trav-
eled (from the quarry to the site), or to the construction itself 
(panels of concentric walls, of huge length, alternated with 
ditches (successively repeated until the stabilization of the 
containment—normally three), would not arouse attention, 
thus canceling out any element of surprise, fundamental to 
the victory achieved. These considerations lead us, there-
fore, to raise the question as to whom the construction of the 
Linhas de Torres should be attributed.
1   Introduction to the Period of the Study
Until now, the success of the defense of Portugal against 
the French invasions of Napoleon has been attributed to the 
alliance achieved, at the time, with the English, who made 
themselves available for this purpose very promptly, and 
who, according to them, in merely one year, reorganized the 
Portuguese army, recruited and trained the local populace, 
and brought about the construction of a defense system for 
Lisbon. That defense system was made up of three protec-
tive lines that encircled the city (Serrão 1982:59-87). 
The defeat of the French troops in Portugal contributed, 
effectively, to the overthrow of the Napoleonic Empire. The 
long duration of the European campaigns, especially the 
failure that occurred in Russia, has been put forward as the 
reason for the demoralization of the invading troops, but 
since they were professionals, it is difficult to understand 
how they could have been defeated by simple peasants, 
largely agricultural workers armed with improvised weap-
ons (Limpo 1887).
That is, in fact, what occurred due to the surprise factor 
of a defense system so ably thrown up on the terrain. In 
addition, the lack of consolidation of political power at that 
time was reflected in the underestimation of the importance 
of the event, and, consequently, in the absence of Portuguese 
representatives in the negotiations of Napoleon’s surrender. 
What can be inferred is that this might well have been due 
to the skilful contrivance effected by those who most ben-
efited from the whole process by obtaining dividends at an 
international level.
At the time, this victory was explained as having resulted 
from the implementation of a system of defense carried out 
by the English, in which: 1) the building was carried out in a 
short period of time (1809-1811) and without knowledge of 
the site; 2) the builders made use of a type of military archi-
tecture little exploited in Saxon culture (the Vauban plan); 
and 3) the construction work was so discreet that neither the 
local populace nor even French spies caught wind of what 
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disclosure. Moreover, the majority of the previous docu-
ments of the Philippine Dynasty (1580-1640) were “res-
cued” by Spain, a fact which further increases the difficulty 
of investigating this period and topic.
It is known that it was King João IV (a contemporary, 
just, of Louis XIV) who established the bases which, in 1790, 
gave rise to the Royal Academy of Artillery Fortification and 
Design (later the Military Academy). The lack of documen-
tation, due probably to the secrecy surrounding knowledge 
related to the art of war, supported by a sort of closed and 
corporative education, does not allow this line of reason-
ing to be pursued. Nevertheless, it is also known that it was 
during the reign of King Pedro II that Manuel de Azevedo 
Fortes, one of the 50 academics who created the Academy 
of the History of Portugal and, later, was promoted to First 
Engineer of the Kingdom (1719), was invited to carry 
out the tasks of technical support (1695). Until his return 
to Portugal, his training took place in the most important 
centers of Europe, including Paris, where for six years he 
lectured at the University of the Seine; that is to say, in the 
same period when Vauban was active, which allows the sup-
position that they knew each other, especially considering 
the interest both manifested in the same science.
Thus, it is perfectly possible to suppose that the one per-
son who had the knowledge and who, very probably, ana-
lyzed the terrain in order to establish the defense of Lisbon 
was Manuel de Azevedo Fortes. At the time that he was 
professionally active, the convent of Mafra was constructed 
3   The Vauban Technique
The characteristics of the structures, in 
spite of the advanced state of disintegra-
tion of some of the fortifications, leads 
to the supposition that the plans were 
those of Vauban—a French military engi-
neer, exercising his profession between 
1655 and 1707, who was responsible 
for the implementation of a new system 
of defense that remained in use until the 
beginning of the 20th century (see Figure 
1). Notwithstanding the secret nature of 
the structural plan, this type of construc-
tion corresponds to the sophistication of 
the alterations of traditional fortifications, 
Greek and Roman, imposed by the advent 
of metallic munitions at the beginning of 
the 15th century.
Given the practical impossibility of 
making solid defense walls in stone suf-
ficiently thick to withstand the impact of 
a metallic projectile launched from a dis-
tance of less than 100 m, their constitution 
was changed to a composition of alternat-
ing layers of stone and earth. This allowed 
the limitations of the former construction 
technique to be overcome, increasing the 
thickness of the parameters, and, in addi-
tion, the different densities of the materials 
were able to absorb the impact of a suc-
cession of missiles launched against them. 
The inconvenience of such structures is that by themselves, 
they could not be very high (hence the need to be situated in 
strategic points of the territory).
To further increase the protective effect against the impact 
of munitions, the structure was built to a geometric design 
where the effects of the ricochet were exploited, which 
allowed, also, focusing the direction of the soldiers’ rounds 
(Figure 2). Vauban’s method was, moreover, complemented 
by a methodology of attack (three systems). Owing to its 
success it was considered infallible, until a further evolution 
in martial armament came about.
Acknowledging that the “invention” of Vauban’s plan 
occurred from 1655 (the date of his nomination as engi-
neer to Louis XIV) the construction of this type of building 
can only be justified if validly useful for defense purposes, 
or, that is, until the beginning of the 20th century, other-
wise they would be considered revivalism or pastiches. For 
this reason, it seems pertinent to widen the research on the 
building of the defensive system of the Linhas de Torres to 
a period previous to its use but in keeping with international 
events.
4   Portuguese Military Science
In Portugal, little is known of the development of military 
science, partially due to stipulations associated with its 
 
Figure 1. Sketch of the Vauban technique.
 
Figure 2. Typical plan of the bastions.
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sequence of military sciences (curiously, the same occurs 
in France relating to the “lineage” of Vauban: Haxo, Séré 
de Riviéres, and Maginot). Captain José Maria das Neves 
Costa2 is known to have guided the English in reconnoiter-
ing the field. In this way, the difficulty of not knowing the 
terrain could be overcome, but a judicious choice such as 
that which was made takes years to prove efficacious. The 
most straightforward explanation is that the supervision of 
Neves Costa brought into being the existing structures, and 
the intervention of the English consisted of adapting them 
to the martial equipment which was then in use; that is, to 
redevelop the military building work planned in 1700 to 
meet the necessities of defense of 1800.
5   Making the Model
The idea that guided the development of this work was the 
determination of the origin of the structures that made up 
the main blockade to the Napoleonic Invasion. However, 
in spite of being able to establish the probable time-frame 
through the simple comparison of international events, it is 
very possible that some of these structures had been imple-
mented on pre-existing ones, particularly those from the 
time of the Romans and the Iron Age. For this reason, the 
research plan would have to contemplate earlier phases of 
construction.
5.1   Data Collection
The first phase in the project, obviously, will be an over-
view of the information relating to the forts, especially of 
those elements which might lead to their localization and 
the constitution of their structures. Given the instability 
experienced at the time, it would be advisable to distinguish 
between what would have been informal defense structures 
thrown up by the populace, such as the conversion of wind-
mills—again, dominating points in the countryside—which 
could be used for lookout systems and/or sentry boxes 
functioning autonomously, and structures dedicated to and 
planned with the intention of being a constituent part of an 
integrated defense system. Thus, the register of properties 
considered as military by the Army would seem to be a good 
starting place for the study.
On the other hand, we can gain some advantage from 
the proceedings of the English who recorded everything 
(Horward 1965, 1973), justifying the high number of mem-
bers of their army with an exhaustive rearguard action and 
also because of their being recent events, which leads us 
to surmise the existence of relatively well-preserved docu-
mentation. All the forts are numbered and their constitu-
tion, in terms of personnel and material, can be discovered 
(Henriques 2005; IGEoE 2005), making possible, also, the 
indications of their hierarchical organization.
From this overview, it can be seen that, for example, the 
first line, whose existence as defense for Lisbon can only be 
justified with the support of a second, has a configuration 
that is different in the west from in the east, taking advan-
tage of a natural structure such as the development of the 
(1717-1744) by order of King João V in gratitude for the 
birth of his son and heir, the future King José I. The site of 
the building, the stone used and the movements on the ter-
rain, could well have been a way of justifying other work 
which needed to be kept secret (see Figure 3).
In the light of this exposé, it seems highly likely that 
the Linhas de Torres were built at the same time the Mafra 
Convent (1717-1744), under the direction of Manuel de 
Azevedo Fortes. The centralizing policy of the (future) 
Marquis of Pombal (that, despite is political activities, 
could not have known the First Engineer, because he was 
only designated Prime Minister in 1750, after Manuel de 
Azevedo Fortes’ death) took it upon himself to keep the 
secret: the defense of Lisbon was a State affair, and the State 
was the Marquis. 
The discreet way in which the construction was carried 
out, the secretiveness associated with it and the time which 
elapsed until its use, allowed nature to bestow on the places 
a camouflage which made them invisible, in spite of being 
located in a zone of ridge crests (Figure 4).
With the Napoleonic invasions, the time had come to 
activate the defense system. Again, there is a hiatus in the 
Figure 3. Sketch map of the system of the Linhas de Torres with 
the location of Mafra (convent) in relation to the centers where the 
main conflicts were registered.
Figure 4. Panoramic view of the Forte das Carvalhas.
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river Sizandro (Lino 1959-1960:159-164) (from the mouth 
as far as the site of occupation in Runa). After that point, it 
becomes difficult to trace any one single line, because of the 
profusion of random structures, especial in Sobral de Monte 
Agraço as far as Alhandra. Parallel to this, it is also towards 
the east that the best-positioned structures are found in terms 
of visibility.
The maps3 of visibility (although such measurements 
depend on other factors, such as the transparency of the 
atmosphere, the existence of obstructions, the height of the 
target, and, in extreme situations, the curve of the earth) 
show that the structures situated at west are “more blind”, 
depending on it’s linearity to communicate, than the struc-
tures situated to the east, visually dominating the territory 
allowing to observe all the southern bank of the estuary of 
the Tagus. For these measurements it was taking into con-
sideration that good human eyesight, unaided by any sup-
plementary device, has, on average, a range of 20 km. 
From this differentiation arise the first speculations as 
to the period of the original construction of the structures. 
At the time of the Romans, the city of Lisbon was not very 
important, in spite of their use of this settlement, because 
it was situated outside the circuit of the main commercial 
maritime routes. The mouth of the Tagus was in Alhandra 
and the whole zone of the estuary was considered as an 
inland sea. Thus, the occupation of the dominant points on 
Alhandra’s area correspond to the earliest period, probably 
from the Iron Age, made by autonomous structures that 
explore the natural slope of the terrain for defensive rea-
sons. For this reason the probability for persistent occupa-
tion in this region is considerably high.
In turn, the western zone is more suitable for the defense 
of the crossing zones, that is, where the river Sizandro can 
be crossed, and for the command of the ocean, a specialty 
deeply rooted in English customs, at least since the time of 
the corsairs.
The second line, making the visual connection between 
the first and Lisbon, was constructed specifically for the city’s 
defense. The implementation of this line probably came to 
be supported by a system of lookout posts and watchtowers 
that formed another line, which passed through Sintra, as a 
reinforcement of the original plan. This was very probably 
made by the Marquis of Pombal, since all the places where 
his intervention has been verified correspond to important 
zones in the conflict. In order to test this hypothesis, the 
characteristics of the stones used in the structure have to 
be analyzed, and detection work must establish whether 
they originated from the same place as those used in the 
Convent of Mafra, well known as being from Pero Pinheiro 
and Cascais. For this purpose, satellite images can be used 
and different radioactive emissions can be analyzed to see 
if they match the quarries from where the stones may have 
originated. In a second approach, tests can be carried out to 
see if the traces of extraction, even from extinct quarries, 
can be found near the structures (and if so, which quarries). 
It is very likely that the two situations occurred simultane-
ously, since it was necessary to adapt the existing structures 
to the equipment of warfare used. Meanwhile, it is expected 
that indications about the phases of construction of the 
structures as a whole will be obtained. Finally, it will be 
necessary to add information concerning the arterial roads 
and the topographical zones more favorable to foot-traffic.
Traditionally, networks of roads are organized on a hier-
archical basis, from beaten tracks, which are the result of 
informal use, to secondary roads and main roads, in per-
manent use and which also can be used for cars and other 
means of transport (figure 5). In turn, the persistence of use 
results in difficulty in attributing a date of road use, which 
can only be overcome if there is some construction system 
to be found as a basis for its delineation (only expected to 
Figure 5. Example of a military road (below) (technology similar 
to that of Roman roads) and a contemporary cartographic record 
of the same road (above)(Luna 2000).
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complemented by the analysis of critical paths. With the 
creation of this virtual archaeological model, the “armies” 
can be manipulated on the battlefields, their performance 
analyzed and their optimal deployments checked.
6   Conclusions
It is a common experience that in times of conflict the suc-
cession of events is so rapid that, occasionally, it becomes 
difficult to arrive at the truth. What is proposed is to draw 
closer to the quantification of information related to the his-
toric event by means of its digitalization associated to the 
place in which it occurred. This digitization should be done 
in order to obtain a rigorous work base suitable for scien-
tific research, and which may also eventually serve as an 
aid to understanding what really happened in that period of 
time. Above all, this essay aims at constructing a memorial 
to those who have contributed to this history of Europe with 
their efforts. 
Endnotes
1Lines of Towers, literal translation
2During the French occupation, Captain Costa worked as 
an aide to the French Engineer Colonel Vicent (Rosa 1979), 
responsible for the drawing up of the plan of defence at 
Junot’s request, along with the Portuguese Engineer Major 
Barreiros.
3Drawn up at ground level based on topographical maps on 
a scale 1:25,000
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occur in cases of the more important roadways.)
Four royal roads from our study period are known: three 
which link Torres Vedras and Lisbon, via Mafra, Cabeço 
de Montachique and Bucelas, respectively, and the fourth 
which connects Alhandra and Lisbon, following the north-
ern bank of the Tagus estuary (Figure 6). In spite of being 
excellent roads for military use, their disadvantage was that 
they passed through three gorges, making them subject to 
ambush.
However, the type of arms used (iron artillery, 6.9 or 
12 in caliber, mounted on old carriages with small wheels, 
difficult to drive over irregular terrain) meant that on the 
one hand, access to the forts had to be made easier (also for 
the maintenance of these redoubts), but which, on the other 
hand, in terms of defense, had to be made more difficult to 
use in order to avoid being seized by enemy forces. 
5.2   Superimposition of Information
At the start of a study of this nature, no claims should be made 
about what one is going to find because that may reflect a 
bias in the interpretation of the results. In the present study, 
the question being raised is the duration of the construction 
of the structures and the technical-cultural knowledge of the 
person to whom their construction is attributed. To some 
extent, it would be easier to think that the French had fallen 
into their own trap. For this purpose, what should be linked 
to the digitalization of information to be considered are the 
records (if they exist) of the period in which the structures 
were erected so that a dynamic model can be created.
The structures, apart from being geo-referenced on 
the terrain, will be continuously complemented by three-
dimensional (3D) graphic information in a way such that 
indications can be obtained about those structures’ defensive 
potential within the environment in which they exist. Their 
accessibility must be analyzed according to the records of 
the period, normally carried out by on-site survey, gaps being 
Figure 6. Sketch map of the Royal Roads. 
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